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Codera: Transferability of the Research Tax Credit

T

his section of The Contemporary Tax Journal includes tax policy work of SJSU
MST students. We offer it here and on the journal website to showcase the range
of tax knowledge the students gain from the program and to provide a public
service. We think the analysis of existing tax rules and proposals using objective tax policy
criteria will be of interest to lawmakers and their staff, and individuals interested in better
understanding taxation.
One of the learning objectives of the SJSU MST Program is: To develop an appreciation
for tax policy issues that underpin our tax laws.
Students learn about principles of good tax policy starting in their first MST class - Tax
Research and Decision-making. The AICPA’s tax policy tool, issued in 2001,1 which lays out
ten principles of good tax policy, is used to analyze existing tax rules as well as proposals for
change.
Beyond their initial tax course,SJSU MST students examine the principles and policies
that underlie and shape tax systems and rules in the Tax Policy Capstone course. In other
courses, such as taxation of business entities and accounting methods, students learn the
policy underlying the rules and concepts of the technical subject matter in order to better
understand the rules and to learn more about the structure and design theory of tax systems.
The seven tax policy analyses included in this section join the growing archive of such
analyses on the journal website (under “Focus on Tax Policy”).
1)

Transferability of the Research Tax Credit.

2)

Return of the 20% Capital Gains Rate for Certain High Income Individuals.

3)

Surtax on Millionaires.

4)

Excessive Compensation – How Much is Too Much?

5)

Increase and Make Permanent the Research Tax Credit.

6)

Preferential Treatment of Capital Gains.

7)

Repeal of the Inclusion of Social Security Benefits in Gross Income.

Focus on Tax Policy: An
Introduction
By: Professor Annette Nellen, SJSU MST Program Director

1
AICPA. (2001) Tax Policy Concept Statement 1 – Guiding Principles of Good Tax Policy: A Framework for
Evaluating Tax Proposals. Available here. Professor Nellen was the lead author of this AICPA document.
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88

Spring/Summer 2013

The Contemporary Tax Journal :A publication of SJSU MST prgram

Spring/Summer 2013

1

89

T

The Contemporary Tax Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10

he Credit for Increasing Research
Activities (IRC §41) has a long and
tumultuous history. In 1981, the credit
made its debut in the Internal Revenue Code.
Congress hoped the credit would help stimulate
productivity, growth and competiveness of U.S.
companies. Since its beginning, the statutory
credit amount, definitions and formulas have been
frequently modified. The credit has also been allowed
to expire and has been retroactively reinstated over
ten times. Between January 2011 and January 2012
there were more than eleven proposals to revise the
research credit1. In early 2013, the “Create Jobs
by Expanding the R&D Tax Credit Act of 2013”2
(H.R. 120) was introduced. This Act would extend
the availability of the credit through December 31,
2014, increase the rate of the regular credit from
20% to 30% or from 14% to 20% for the alternative
simplified credit, and allow the credit to be assigned
or transferred from a qualified taxpayer who earns
the credit to another taxpayer designated by the
qualified taxpayer.

tax benefits provided by the government; they are nearly impossible to determine. Projects
that will be pursued regardless of government subsidies are windfall projects.4
Evidence suggests “the credit has delivered no more than a modest stimulus to domestic
business R&D investment.”5 Despite this, every Administration has supported the R&D credit
since its enactment,6 and there is broad bipartisan support for extending the research credit.7
Policy makers should consider the results of years of discussion and analysis in
developing their proposals. It is also important to consider principles of good tax policy in
developing any proposal. The analysis below examines the efficiency and effectiveness of
adding a provision to IRC §41 for qualified taxpayers (small business concerns as defined by
the Small Business Act) to transfer credits earned under the provision to a person designated by
the taxpayer. Under the proposal, amounts received by the taxpayer for the credits transferred
are not included in gross income.
This paper provides an overview of H.R. 120 (113th Congress) and analyzes it using
the ten principles of good tax policy outlined in the AICPA Statement #1, Guiding Principles of
Good Tax Policy: A Framework for Evaluating Tax Proposals.

Transferability
of the Research
have researched and analyzed
Tax Credit the needManyforagencies
compensation for the spillover benefits
By: Erika Codera,
MST Student

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sjsumstjournal/vol3/iss1/10
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of research and development (R&D) activities,and
the strengths and areas for improvement of IRC§41
and its overall effectiveness. It is clear that private
market bias against research demands government
intervention across all sectors to produce optimal
levels of technological development.3 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
suggested the need to modify the credit to ensure that
it is available formarginal projects, with the benefit
for windfall projects reduced. Marginal projects are
those which a taxpayer may not invest in without the

1
Guenther, G. (2011, Nov. 29). Research Tax Credit:
Current Law, Legislation in the 112th Congress, and Policy Issues.
Congressional Research Service.
2
H.R. 120 (113th Congress) (2013, Jan. 3). Create Jobs by
Expanding the R&D Tax Credit Act of 2013. Retrieved from http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:h.r.00120:
3
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. (2011,
Sep. 16). Tax Incentives for Research, Experimentation, and
Innovation. Retrieved from https://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=4358

4
Government Accountability Office. (2009, Nov. 6). Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Tax Policy:
The Research Tax Credits Design and Administration can be Improved. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10136.pdf
5
Guenther, 2011.
6
R&D Credit Coalition (2011, Jun. 2). Research and Development Incentives in the U.S. and Abroad Submitted for
the Record of the Hearing on “How Business Tax Reform Can Encourage Job Creation” before the Committee on Ways
and Means. Retrieved from http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/research_and_development_incentives_in_
the_u.s._and_abroad.pdf
7
R&D Credit Coalition, (2013, Apr. 15). Comments for the Ways and Means Tax Reform Working Group on
Manufacturing, Retrieved from http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/r_and_d_credit_coalition.pdf
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Principles of Good Tax Policy Evaluation
Codera: Transferability of the Research Tax Credit

Equity and Fairness

Certainty

The tax rules should clearly specify when the tax
is to be paid, how it is to be paid, and how the
amount to be paid is to be determined.

Similarly
situated
taxpayers
should be taxed similarly.

Allowing the R&D tax credit to be
transferred for a price would decrease the
perception of equity and fairness. The public
will see corporations that potentially have no
R&D activities, yet have sufficient profits to
purchase R&D tax credits, are able to reduce
their average effective tax rates. Taxpayers may
feel at a disadvantage because although these
corporations have high taxable income, they are
paying taxes at potentially low average effective
rates. Only a small number of taxpayers, directly
impacted by the inherent problem of generating
credits that cannot be used currently, would
likely see a direct benefit and perceive the policy
as equitable and fair.
The policy would also negatively impact
vertical equity. Shifting the tax benefit from the
entity that rightfully earned it violates the ability to
pay principle. Although corporations with large
profits and tax liabilities have a greater ability to
pay, if they can afford to purchase tax credits,
they will not be subject to their “fair share” of the
tax burden.

T

this to a large multinational company that has
income producing activities that can fund R&D.
Such a company is able to utilize credits earned
immediately to offset their tax burdens generated
from existing profitable lines of business. The
two taxpayers described above are not “situated
similarly” and, therefore, should have differing
rules on how the R&D tax credits function. This
proposal mitigates this horizontal inequity.

his proposal does not impact
the mechanics of qualifying for
the credit, calculating the credit,
or limiting use of the credit. Amounts paid to
purchase credits are not included in income of
the seller.

However, the proposal does not eliminate
horizontal inequity.
The smaller taxpayer
assigning the credits faces a loss on the
transaction. It would likely not get paid the full
value of the credits earned, and it would have
additional costs related to marketing the credit.
The larger company buying the credits makes a
profit on the transaction because they pay less
than the full benefit they receive and their costs
to participate in the transaction may be less.

There is some uncertainty as to who
qualifies to transfer or use the credit. The ability
of taxpayers to transfer credits is limited. Such
limitations increase taxpayer uncertainty. One
company comparing itself to another company
may be confused why the rules are applied
differently. It is not well defined who would be
eligible to purchase the credits. The IRS would
have to issue regulations that would provide
more detailed guidance.

Guidance would be needed on how to
treat the costs of the taxpayer acquiring the tax
credits.

Convenience of payment

A tax should be due at a time or in a manner that
is most likely to be convenient for the taxpayer.

T

his proposal does not significantly
impact the convenience of payment
principle of good tax policy because
it will not impact the current tax filing and payment
rules. However, due to increased complexity of
reporting credits earned, purchased, used or
sold, there likely will be issues related to timing
and substantiating credits which will negatively
impact the convenience of payment principle

Earning R&D tax credits without the
opportunity to obtain immediate benefits is
unfair. Quite often, small companies invest
heavily in R&D and have little or no tax liabilities
for an extended period of time. Such companies
are not able to materialize R&D credits (in their
current form) until they generate taxable income,
which can be years down the line, when the
need for the subsidy may be lessened. Compare
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2013
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Economy of Collection

Simplicity

Neutrality

The tax law should be simple so that taxpayers
The costs to collect a tax should be kept to a
can understand the rules and comply with them
minimum for both the government and taxpayers.
correctly and in a cost-efficient manner.

T

his proposal will cause increases
in costs of auditing returns,
decreasing the economy in
collection. If a taxpayer that uses the credits
did not earn them, the IRS would not be able to
audit at that level the nature of the costs or the
calculation of the credits. When the IRS audits
taxpayers that earned the credits and sold them,
if there is a change to the amount of the credit
that had been previously transferred, it would
be difficult to collect the additional tax due from
the purchaser. Also, the high level of audit risk
associated with R&D credits would likely impact
the marketability of the transfers. The efficiency
of these transactions would likely be low.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sjsumstjournal/vol3/iss1/10
DOI: 10.31979/2381-3679.2013.030110
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S

everal factors of the proposal
increase complexity:

1. effective period is only two years,
2. applicability is
taxpayers,” and

limited

to

3. administrative burdens and
compliance costs are high.

“qualified
taxpayer

Although this proposal attempts to
simplify the definition of “qualified taxpayer”
by referencing section 3 of the Small Business
Act, it complicates this definition by adding
an additional threshold of average number of
employees during the year.

The effect of the tax law on a taxpayer’s decisions
as to how to carry out a particular transaction
or whether to engage in a transaction should be
kept to a minimum.

T

he R&D tax credit is designed to
encourage investment in R&D,
thus making the general provision
biased. The new marketability of credits may
cause further distortions in taxpayer decisions.
This proposal may potentially encourage some
taxpayers to invest more in R&D activities if
they have an option of monetizing the credits
currently. Also, buyers of credits may infuse
too much funding, causing an inefficient level
of investment in R&D. These possible effects
negatively impact the neutrality principle of good
tax policy.

The Contemporary Tax Journal :A publication of SJSU MST prgram

Economic Growth and Efficiency Economy o
Collection

The tax system should not impede or reduce the
productive capacity of the economy.

M

easuring economic efficiency is
extremely difficult and uncertain.
Because this proposal potentially
distorts taxpayer behavior, it may impede
economic growth and efficiency. However,
positive externalities that occur with R&D activity
impact the ability of companies to fully capture
the financial benefits of their investments.
Tax benefits are one way to make up for the
spillover. This proposal also makes the tax
benefits realizable more immediately, so it may
help economic growth and efficiency because
the influx of cash into businesses will provide
them the opportunity to invest more.

Spring/Summer 2013
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Transparency and
Visibility

Appropriate
Government Revenue

Taxpayers should know that a
tax exists and how and when
it is imposed upon them and
others

The tax system should enable
the government to determine
how much tax revenue will
likely be collected and when.

T

his
proposal
negatively
impacts
the
transparency and visibility of
the tax law. It significantly
increases
perceived
inequities,
increases
administration costs, results
in more errors, and is short
lived, which causes frustration
for taxpayers and advisors to
plan transactions and comply
with the law. The tax base
and rate are not affected.
However, shifting benefits
between taxpayers makes it
more difficult for lawmakers
and policy analysts to see
the impact of the subsidies
provided by the government
and determine if the policy is
effective.

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2013
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llowing
the
transfer
of
credits
may
make the determination
of tax expenditures more
predictable and reliable.
Many taxpayers who claim
credits are not able to
currently use them, and it is
difficult for the government
to know when they will likely
be able to use them. This
causes uncertainty in timing
of tax expenditures

Spring/Summer 2013

Rating summary

Minimum Tax Gap

Equity and Fairness

A tax should be structured to
minimize non-compliance.

T

his
proposal
may encourage
non-compliance.
Taxpayers may be more
aggressive
in
their
determination of credits they
have an option of transferring
the credits to other taxpayers.
Also, because the level of
complexity is increased,
unintentional noncompliance
may
increase.
The
consequence
of
errors
(whether or not intentional)
may not be clear. As a result,
taxpayers may be more
careless in their application
of the proposed provisions.

+/-

Certainty

-

Convenience of Payment

-

Economy in Collection

-

Simplicity

-

Neutrality

-

Economic Growth and Efficiency

+/-

Transparency and Visibility

-

Minimum Tax Gap

-

Appropriate Government

+

Conclusion

T

he transferability provision of H.R. 120 (113th Congress) does not represent
good tax policy based on the analysis of the AICPA’s ten guiding principles. It
does not significantly contribute to the efficiency or effectiveness of IRC §41.
Instead of getting another taxpayer involved in the transaction, the government can make the
credits fully or partially refundable. The impact of the expenditure would essentially be the
same; however, principles of good tax policy may be better served. Instead of using the tax
law to meet the need of society to subsidize spillover costs of R&D, the government should
consider programs like providing grants or financing, which could be more which efficient and
effective in meeting their economic goals.
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